Abstract. Collective coin-flipping is the problem of producing common random bits in a distributed computing environment with adversarial faults. We consider the perfect information model: all communication is by broadcast and corrupt players are computationally unbounded. Protocols in this model may involve many asynchronous rounds. We assume that honest players communicate only uniformly random bits. We demonstrate that any n-player coin-flipping protocol that is resilient against corrupt coalitions of linear size must use either at least [1/2 − o(1)] log * n communication rounds or at least [log (2k−1) n] 1−o(1) communication bits in the kth round, where log (j) denotes the logarithm iterated j times. In particular, protocols using one bit per round require [1/2 − o(1)] log * n rounds. These bounds also apply to the leader election problem. The primary component of this result is a new bound on the influence of random sets of variables on Boolean functions. Finally, in the one-round case, using other methods we prove a new bound on the influence of sets of variables of size βn for β > 1/3.
Introduction.
Collective coin-flipping is the problem of producing a common random bit in a distributed computing environment with adversarial faults. We consider the perfect information model introduced by Ben-Or and Linial [5] , which can be informally described as follows. A protocol in this model consists of a sequence of rounds. In each round, each player privately generates a uniformly random string of bits of some specified length (possibly 0) and broadcasts the string. Each broadcast is received by all players and the identity of the sender is known with certainty. The round ends after all broadcasts are received. After the completion of all rounds, the outcome of the protocol is computed separately by each player as a prespecified function of all the values broadcast during the protocol; for the coin-flipping problem the outcome is a single bit. A protocol Π is said to be an (n, r, )-protocol if n is the number of players, r is the number of rounds, and each player broadcasts at most bits in each round.
Faults are modeled by the presence of an unknown set of b corrupt players who collude in order to bias the outcome. Players are assumed to be computationally unbounded. In addition, the system is not able to enforce perfect synchrony within a round; thus in each round, the corrupt players may wait to see the broadcasts of the other players before selecting their strings.
While not necessary for previous upper bounds, we strengthen our lower bounds by assuming that corrupt players may cheat only in ways that are undetectable to the other players. This means that when the protocol specifies that such a player broadcast a bit string of a given length, he must do so; however, he may cheat by broadcasting a string that he chooses rather than a random string.
The simplest protocol is one that designates a single player to flip a coin, the value of which is the outcome of the protocol; of course, this is unsatisfactory if that player happens to be faulty. More generally, an (n, 1, 1)-protocol is defined by a Boolean function f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}; each player i broadcasts a bit r i and the outcome is f (r 1 , . . . , r n ). Throughout the paper we use the terms Boolean function and (n, 1, 1)-protocol interchangeably.
The primary goal in designing a protocol is to ensure that it can tolerate as many cheaters as possible. 
where the probability is taken with respect to the random bits generated by the players outside of B. (b) Π is (b, γ)-resilient for an integer b ≤ n if it is (B, γ)-resilient for all B
with |B| ≤ b. 2. Let Π = (Π n : n ≥ 1) be a sequence where Π n is an n-player protocol, and let b(n) be a function mapping n to an integer b(n) ≤ n. We say that Π is b(n)-resilient if there exists γ > 0 (independent of n) such that for all n, Π n is (b(n), γ)-resilient. For example, in the case of (n, 1, 1)-protocols, the parity function, n i=1 r i mod 2, is not even 1-resilient, while the majority function is c √ n-resilient for any positive c. Ajtai and Linial [1] constructed a Boolean function that is Ω(n/ log 2 n)-resilient. Kahn, Kalai, and Linial, in a 1988 tour de force, proved an upper bound on the resilience of Boolean functions.
Theorem 2 (see [13] ).
We emphasize that this bound applies only to (n, 1, 1)-protocols. Indeed, Alon and Naor [2] showed that there are protocols using n rounds that are Ω(n)-resilient, and this was followed by a sequence of papers giving more efficient protocols with linear resilience. In what follows log (k) (n) denotes the maximum of 1 and the kth iterated base 2 logarithm, and log * n is the least integer k such that log (k) (n) = 1. The most efficient known protocol is that of [16] , requiring log * n + O(1) rounds; players send messages of length O(log (k) n) during the kth round. The protocol achieves βn-resilience for any β < 1/2. (As noted in [17] no protocol can be n/2-resilient.) This protocol can be modified to yield a one bit per round protocol with 1 + o(1) log n rounds. Subsequently, Feige [9] gave a simpler protocol with similar properties.
Despite rapid progress in our understanding of protocols for the problem, very little beyond Theorem 2 was known on the negative side. The major contribution of this article is an extension of Theorem 2 to protocols with many rounds. We will prove the following theorem.
For instance, when r(n) = 1 this reduces to Theorem 2, and when r(n) = 2 it implies that no (n, 2, 1)-protocol can be ω(n/ log log log n)-resilient.
We extend the notation above to describe protocols with variable communication complexity: a protocol Π is said to be an (n, r, )-protocol if n is the number of players, r is the number of rounds, and no more than k bits are broadcast by any player in the kth round, where = ( 1 , . . . , r ). We will prove that the conclusion of Theorem 3 holds even if we relax the requirement that each player sends only one bit per round.
Theorem 4. There is a function η :
Recall that current upper bounds provide (n, log * n + O(1), )-protocols which are linearly resilient, where k = O(log (k) n). The leader election problem is that of selecting a "leader" among n players so that the probability that any coalition (of appropriate size) can elect one of its own members is at most 1 − for a constant > 0 independent of n. Adopting the above model, the notion of resilience may be extended to this scenario. Collective coin-flipping may be reduced to leader election at the cost of an extra round: the leader may flip a fair coin. Our bounds shall then naturally apply to this problem as well. For a more detailed discussion of coin-flipping, leader election, and the perfect information model, see [7, 14] . Section 2 gives definitions, notation, and preliminary facts. The two main theorems are proved in section 3 and section 4. In section 5 an observation is made about the behavior of large linear sized coalitions. We conclude with some open questions.
Preliminaries.
2.1. General notation. Throughout, ln x denotes the natural logarithm and log x the logarithm base 2. To avoid logarithms of negative numbers, iterated logarithms are defined inductively as follows: for x ≥ 1, log (0) (x) = x, and for k ≥ 1,
For x ≥ 1, define log * (x) to be the smallest natural number k for which log (k) x = 1. For a positive real number y and integer k the tower function T(k; y) is defined by T(0; y) = y, and
Observe that for any y ≥ 1, k ≤ , log (k) (T( ; y)) = T( − k; y). For an integer n, we denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. For J ⊆ [n], a finite set X, and α ∈ X J , C(α) denotes the set of all points x ∈ X n such that
If S is a set, the notation x ∈ U S indicates that x is selected uniformly at random from S.
2.2.
Coin-flipping protocols and influence. We want to formalize the definition of protocol given in the introduction. We below define (n, r, )-protocols and a number of related notions; (n, r, )-protocols, where communication is constant across rounds, are covered as a special case. For an (n, r, 1)-protocol Π we suppress the third index and simply say that Π is an (n, r)-protocol.
Formally, an (n, r, )-protocol is a function
Such a protocol is executed in r rounds. In the presence of a set B ⊂ [n] of bad players, the protocol operates as follows. In round i, the players in
[n]\B uniformly at random. Then, depending on α 1 , . . . , α i , the players in B choose their values. Formally, an (n, r, )-strategy for B is a sequence S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S r ) of functions where
The function S i specifies the choices of the bad players in round i as a function of the choices of the good players in the first i rounds. The outcome of protocol Π, with bad player set B playing strategy S, is a function of the sequence
of the random coins of the good players, which is denoted Π( α; S) and is defined to be
, and strategy S,
, the natural probability of Π, is the probability that the outcome is 1 if there are no bad players; 
An (n, 1)-protocol corresponds to a Boolean function f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}, and we typically use the letter f (instead of Π) for such a protocol. It is not hard to see that p 1 f (B) is the probability, with respect to α ∈ U {0, 1}
[n]\B , that 1 ∈ f (C(α)) and that I f (B) is the probability that f is not constant on C(α).
The following result, observed in [6] (cf. Proposition 2.2 of [13] ), implies that the most resilient one-round protocols are given by Boolean functions that are monotone.
Proposition 6. For any Boolean function f , there exists a monotone Boolean function g on the same set of variables for which
. Finally, we need a variant of a fact first noted in [10] and based on a result in [13] , which asserts that if no variable in a Boolean function has large influence, then the average influence of a variable cannot be too small. For completeness, we include a proof.
Proof. Letv ∈ R n denote the vector with
By complementing if necessary, we may assume that p 
Inequality (2.10.1) of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya [11] asserts that
Setting q = 1 and r = 2 1+δ and letting s tend to ∞, we obtain
Substituting this into the inequality (2.1) and setting δ = 1/2 we get
Choose t such that θ = 2 −3t /t 3 (noting that t > 1 since θ < 1/8). Then the previous inequality implies S 1 
and therefore
A tail bound for submartingales.
Our main theorems are proved by considering a certain stochastic process which, for a Boolean function, selects a set of variables likely to have large influence. Our analysis of this stochastic process involves a tail bound for submartingales, which we record below.
Definition 8. A submartingale is a sequence of real valued random variables
We were unable to find the exact form of the following tail bound in the literature, so we have included a proof. The basic method is developed in [8, 4, 12] . Our treatment follows [3, 15] .
. , n} and assume that
Proof. Observe that for any α > 0,
Letting
By induction, we compute
Setting α = ln(
3. Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by considering (n, r)-protocols; each round consists of a single bit broadcast by each player. Fix the integer r. We say that a protocol Π is α-nontrivial if the natural probability of Π is at least α, i.e., p if necessary, we may assume that the protocol is 1/2-nontrivial. We want to show that if Π is an (n, r)-protocol, then for n sufficiently large there is a set B of b n players so that B can almost always force the outcome to 1. For r = 1 this follows from Theorem 2.
We illustrate the ideas for r > 1 by looking at the two round case. By separating the inputs associated with each round, a two round protocol may be viewed as a function to functions:
As Π is 1/2-nontrivial, many g's will be 1/4-nontrivial (any constant less than 1/2 would do) and by Theorem 2, for each such g there is a sublinear set of players B 2 that can force this g to be 1 with high probability. Also by Theorem 2, there is a sublinear set of players B 1 that can likewise force the output of Π to be one of these g's. A natural strategy is to choose B = B 1 ∪ B 2 .
The problem with this plan is that B 2 depends on g; we really need one B 2 that works for many g's. We show this by proving that a random B 2 will work with significant probability for any 1/4-nontrivial g. It follows that a random B 2 will work for many g's. For general r, we will proceed by induction, with our inductive assumption being that a random sublinear set of players can control the protocol with significant probability.
To make these ideas rigorous, we begin with some definitions. For
In this notation, we are aiming to show that for some δ > 0 and b n, (δ, b) ∈ C n (r; 1/2, o(1)) for sufficiently large n. We prove the somewhat stronger statement that (δ, b) ∈ C n (r; o (1) ).
The basis case of the induction on r is provided by the following result for oneround protocols.
Lemma 11. Let n ∈ N and γ ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and b ≤ n, and assume γb ≥ 400n/ log n.
The induction step is provided by the following lemma.
These two lemmas are combined to prove the following lemma. Lemma 13. Let b ≤ n ∈ N and γ ∈ (0, Then for all r ≥ 1 such that γb ≥ 800λ r−1 n/ log n,
An immediate consequence of this lemma is the following corollary.
Corollary 14. Let n, b, γ, and λ i be as in Lemma 13 and suppose that r is an integer such that
γb log n 800n ≥ λ r−1 .
Then if Π is an (n, r)-protocol that is rγ-nontrivial, there exists at least one subset B of size rb that is rγ-powerful.
We first deduce the main theorem from this corollary. Proof of Theorem 3. We prove the second part of the theorem first. Let r(n) be an integer valued function with r(n) ≤ (1/2 − ) log * n and let Π = (Π n : n ≥ 1) be a sequence where Π n is an (n, r(n))-protocol. Let
where a(n) is any function tending to infinity. Let n be sufficiently large, and suppose for contradiction that for some γ > 0, Π is (b(n), γ)-resilient. Without loss of generality we may assume that p
.
By the previous corollary applied to b and γ , if
then there is at least one subset of size r(n)b (n) = b(n) that is (r(n)γ (n) = γ/2)-powerful, which would contradict our assumption. So it suffices to show that inequality (3.1) hold When r = 1 inequality (3.1) holds, for large enough n, by inspection. Otherwise, taking log (2r−2) of both sides, the left-hand side is at least 1 2 log (2r−1) n for large enough n and so it suffices to show that this is an upper bound on log (2r−2) λ r−1 . In the following proposition, T denotes the tower function, as defined in section 2.1. Using the proposition, and the assumption about b, for n sufficiently large we have
as required to complete the proof of the second part of the theorem. For the first part of the theorem, it suffices to note that if r(n) ≤
This follows by taking log (∆) of both sides: log (∆) (r(n) 2 ) ≤ 2 while log (∆) (log (2r(n)−1) n) ≥ T(∆; 2). Hence we can choose b(n) = o(n) so that it satisfies the hypothesis and, hence, the conclusion of the second part of the theorem.
So it remains to prove Lemmas 11, 12, and 13.
Proof of Lemma 11.
Let f be a γ-nontrivial function on n variables. We want to show that for b in the given range, a "large" fraction of the sets of size b are γ-powerful. In light of Proposition 6, we may assume that f is monotone.
Fix γ ∈ (0, 1/2). We first describe a stochastic process for selecting a sequence of variables v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v d for an integer d to be specified, and show that with probability at least 1/2, the process produces a set of variables that is γ-powerful. The process depends on a parameter s, which we will also specify later. Having selected the first k of these variables v 1 , . . . , v k , let f k denote the (monotone) Boolean function on n − k variables obtained by setting each v i to 1. We then select v k+1 as follows:
1. If there is a variable v whose influence in f k is at least 2 −s , let v k+1 be such a variable of lowest index. 2. Otherwise, choose v k+1 uniformly at random from among the remaining n−k variables. We will establish the following claim.
Claim A. Let n be sufficiently large and let d ∈ [n] and γ ∈ (0, 1/2), and suppose that γd ≥ 160n log n . Let s, the parameter of the process, be 80n γd . Then
Define random variables X k and Z k , for i = 0, . . . , d, by
Claim A is easily deduced from the following two claims. In both claims, n, d, γ, and s are as in Claim A.
Assume Claims B and C. Let s = 80n/γd. Since γd ≥ 160n/ log n, and d ≤ n, s satisfies the hypothesis of Claim C and therefore
Applying Lemma 9 with µ = 4 and δ = 3/4 gives 
, which is at least sγ/(20n) for s ≤ log(20n) − log log(20n). If rule 2 was used to select v k , Lemma 7 gives the desired conclusion. This establishes Claim C and thus Claim A.
We now complete the proof of Lemma 11. The idea is that there are few variables chosen by rule 1, so with nonnegligible probability a random set of variables will contain them all.
More specifically, the hypothesis of the lemma implies that if we set d = b/2 , then d and γ satisfy the hypothesis of Claim A. We will use Claim A to show that a random subset of size b is γ-powerful with the required probability. Choose s = 80n/(γd) in accordance with Claim A, and observe that s ≤ v(S, σ) = (v 1 , . . . , v d ) is selected as above, except that rule 2 is replaced by "let i be the least integer such that σ (i) is not a member of {v 1 , . . . , v k−1 } and set v k = σ(i) ." It is easy to see that this process generates the same distribution over sequences v 1 , . . . , v d as the original process. Let R 1 (S, σ) be the set of v i 's chosen according to rule 1, and let R 2 (S, σ) be the set of those v i 's chosen according to rule 2. Obviously,
. Now, consider a randomly chosen set B of size b. We view the probability space for B as consisting of triples (S, σ, T ), where S and σ are as above and T is a random subset of size
. By Claim A, event (i) occurs with probability at least 1/2. Now, for any S 0 ⊂ [n] of size b, we may estimate the probability of event (ii) conditioned on S = S 0 : since R 1 (S, σ) − S has size at most 2
, from which follows the statement of the lemma.
This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
Proof of Lemma 12.
We first give a modified (and slightly more general) formulation of the lemma which will make the exposition a bit clearer.
To deduce Lemma 12 from this, suppose that δ 1 , b 1 , r 1 , γ 1 , δ 2 , b 2 , r 2 , and γ 2 are given satisfying the hypotheses of Lemma 12. Apply the above lemma with the same δ i , b i , and r i , and with α 1 = 2γ 1 /δ 2 , β 1 = γ 1 , and α 2 = β 2 = γ 2 .
So we prove Lemma 16.
We want to lower bound the probability that a (uniformly) random subset
A random subset B of size b 1 + b 2 can be selected by selecting subsets B 1 , B 2 , C, where B 1 is a uniformly random subset of size b 1 , B 2 is a uniformly random subset of size b 2 , and C is a uniformly random subset of n − (B 1 ∪ B 2 ) of size
Clearly, the probability that B = B 1 ∪ B 2 ∪ C is β 1 + β 2 -powerful is at least the probability that B 1 ∪ B 2 is β 1 + β 2 -powerful, so we lower bound this latter probability.
To do this, we define an event V that implies that B 1 ∪ B 2 is β 1 + β 2 -powerful and such that Pr B1,B2 [V ] can be analyzed.
The input to Π is a vector in ({0, 1} n ) r1+r2 . Fixing the outcome of the first r 1 rounds to σ ∈ ({0, 1} n ) r1 gives rise to an (n,
by assigning
can be viewed as a function of σ. Let E be the set of those σ for which p
For B 2 ⊂ [n], let E B2 be the set of all σ ∈ E such that B 2 is β 2 -powerful with respect to the protocol Π[ σ], i.e.,
We now define V to be the event (depending on B 1 and
First we show that V implies that B 1 ∪ B 2 is β 1 + β 2 -powerful in Π. Consider the following two-step strategy for B 1 ∪ B 2 : (i) For the first r 1 rounds, B 1 plays so as to maximize the probability that σ ∈ E B2 . Assuming this is successful then (ii) during the next r 2 rounds, B 2 tries to force the outcome of Π to be 1. The probability that this strategy fails is at most the sum of the probability that (i) fails and that (ii) fails given that (i) succeeds. The probability that (i) fails is at most β 1 by the definition of V . Assuming that (i) succeeds, the probability that (ii) fails is at most β 2 by the definition of the relation E B2 . Thus, given V , B 1 
By the definition of E, 
So we lower bound this latter probability. For σ ∈ E, the protocol Π[ σ] is an (n, r 2 ) protocol that is α 2 -nontrivial. Thus, by the hypothesis of the lemma, for any σ ∈ E,
Summing over σ ∈ E and dividing by |E| we obtain
Finally, we lower bound Pr[V |U η ]. V is the event that B 1 is β 1 -powerful inΠ B2 . The event U η implies that the protocolΠ B2 is η-nontrivial, and for η = α 1 δ 2 /2, the hypothesis of the lemma implies that the probability that V occurs is at least δ 1 .
Proof of Lemma 13.
Fix b, n, and γ as hypothesized. Let H(r) denote the hypothesis γb ≥ 800nλ r−1 / log n, and let C(r) denote the conclusion
We want to show that H(r) implies C(r) for all r ≥ 1. We proceed by induction on r. The basis case is immediate from Lemma 11. For the induction step, let r ≥ 1, and suppose that H(r) implies C(r). Assume H(r + 1) is true; we want to show C(r + 1) holds. Now H(r + 1) implies H(r) since λ r ≥ λ r−1 , and hence C(r) holds. If γ ∈ (0, 1/2) is such that γ b ≥ 400n/ log n, then Lemma 11 implies
Combining this and C(r) using Lemma 12, and setting γ = γ 2λr , gives
which is equivalent to C(r + 1). This completes the proof of Lemma 13 and the proof of the main theorem.
Extensions to protocols with longer messages.
We now indicate how to generalize the bounds proven above to protocols which permit players to send longer messages. Recall that for n, r ∈ N and = ( 1 , . . . , r ) ∈ N r , we say that Π is a (n, r, )-protocol if n is the number of players, r is the number of rounds, and no more than k bits are broadcast by each player in the kth round.
We extend Definition 10 to account for variable message lengths. Definition 17. Let C n (r; α, β) (written C n (r; γ) when α = β = γ) denote the collection of pairs δ, b so that for any (n, r, )-protocol Π that is α-nontrivial, at least a δ fraction of sets B ⊂ [n] of size b are β-powerful in Π.
We begin by considering a single-round protocol f : ({0, 1} ) n → {0, 1} in which each player broadcasts bits. Simply treating f as a function on n Boolean variables and examining the stochastic process of Section 3.1 yields the following version of Claim A. {0, 1} ) n . Observe that applying Claim A in this way does not exploit the fact that each player controls many bits of the function f . The proof of Lemma 11 now yields the following lemma.
Lemma 18 (cf. Lemma 11). Let n, ∈ N and γ ∈ (0, , rb ∈ C n (r; rγ), where = (l r−1 , . . . , l 0 ). We want to show that H(r) implies C(r) for all r ≥ 1. We proceed by induction on r. The basis case is immediate from Lemma 18. For the induction step, let r ≥ 1, and suppose that H(r) implies C(r). Assume H(r + 1) is true; we want to show that
